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Abstract 
 
 
 With earthshaking and jaw-breaking levels of corruption in the African continent, the 
question on the extent to which corruption influences crime still remains unanswered. This 
paper assesses the effect of corruption (corruption-control) in 38 African countries using 
updated data. We find that, crime is highly positively (negatively) correlated with corruption 
(corruption-control). The potential mitigation effect (by corruption-control) is higher than the 
corresponding positive effect of corruption, implying, corruption-control offsets crime 
emanating beyond the corruption mechanism (inter alia, other poor governance mechanisms). 
The relationship is statistically strong when controlling for the number of police officers, age 
dependency, per capital economic prosperity, level of education, government effectiveness 
and population density. Given that crime is proxied by the level of organized internal conflict, 
the findings also sustain the substantial role of corruption in the birth and propagation of 
conflicts within and across Africa. Policy implications are discussed.  
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1. Introduction  
 
 From an ideal standpoint, a government is expected to improve the quality of life and 
wellbeing of its citizens by protecting the lives and property of the citizens from criminals. 
Accordingly, a sustainable macroeconomic growth path as a means to the above ends could 
seriously be stemmed by poor government quality, especially corruption (Mauro, 1995). To 
this effect, a recent stream of studies has focused on the fundamental issue by examining the 
nexus between governance and wellbeing (Helliwell and Huang 2008; Ott 2010; Yamamura 
et al., 2012).  
 Over the past decades, the issue of crime (conflicts) and the search for strategies to 
combat its (their) corrosive effects has grown in importance as a topic of public debate and 
criterion by which civil society evaluates leadership. This increasing focus is motivated by the 
growing realization among international development experts that, development requires 
above all, socio-economic security and government quality. Accordingly, counseling on 
sound policies, well intentioned incentives and aid efforts may not achieve the desired 
objectives unless they are offered in an environment that stimulates self-sustaining growth 
and development. There is equally a mounting realization that unsustainable policies do not 
always emerge from a lack of knowledge about what best policies should be. Instead, these 
policies could result just as much from decision makers distorting economic policies for their 
own interests (corruption), in an atmosphere where impunity and criminality are orders of the 
day. To the best of our knowledge, the African continent broadly reflects the issues 
highlighted above.  
 Corruption and crime have substantially infringed on the growth and development 
opportunities in the African continent. In fact the institutional environment in Africa over the 
last decade has been plagued by corruption, political strife and a host of investor-unfriendly 
governance qualms (Kenyan post election crises in 2007/2008, Zimbabwe’s economic 
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meltdown, Nigeria’s marred transition in 2008, the Ivorian political crisis, the unending 
Egyptian revolution  and long-standing issue of Somalia as a failed state, recent coups d’états 
in Mali and Guinea-Bissau, the mounting rebellion in the Central African Republic and inter 
alia, most recently, the Malian crisis that is currently mobilizing international military 
resources). Beside the above crimes/conflicts, corruption could also be conceived as a crime 
against African development (Furphy, 2010), a position first raised in 2009 by the United 
Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) Southern Africa representative, and confirmed 
by Transparency International’s (TI’s) Corruption Perception Index (CPI) of October 2010 
that identified Africa as the most corrupt region in the world.  
 In light of the above, there has been a renewed interest in the role of corruption in 
African development. The perilous character of development assistance (Asongu, 2012a); 
how existing corruption-control levels (Asongu, 2013a) in the presence of wealth-effects 
(Asongu, 2013b) matter in the fight against the scourge; its detrimental character on stock 
market performance dynamics (Asongu, 2012b); the status of corruption-control as the most 
effective tool in the battle against the burgeoning phenomenon of African software piracy 
(Asongu & Andrés, 2013); the anatomy, causes and consequences of corruption (Kodila-
Tekida, 2013, 2012ab); the nexus between alcohol and corruption (Kodila-Tekida, 2012c), 
inter alia. 
 Consistent with Kodila-Tedika (2012b), a lot has been documented on the 
consequences of corruption. The debate on socio-economic consequences include: no effects
1
, 
negative effects (Mauro, 1995; Mo 2001; Ugur & Dasgupta, 2011) or positive effects
2
 on 
economic growth and investment; slightly weak effect of corruption on economic growth 
through investment (Mauro, 1997); negative incidence in investment-focused studies (Mauro, 
1997; Brunetti et al., 1998; Aysan et al., 2007; Baliamoune-Lutz & Ndikumana, 2007; 
                                                 
1
 See Brunetti et  al. (1998) & Li et al. (2000).   
2
 Marginal positive effects could prevail in countries with very high institutional deficiency (Houston, 2007; Aidt 
et al., 2008; Aidt, 2009; Méon and Weill, 2010).  
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Everhart et al., 2009); perilous impact on foreign direct investment (Wei, 2000a) and bank 
credit (Wei, 2000b; Wei & Wu, 2001; Ahlin & Pang, 2008) in capital flows studies; negative 
quality (Tanzi & Davoodi, 1997) and return (Haque & Kneller, 2008; De la Croix & 
Delavallade, 2007) of public expenditure, especially in military (Gupta et al., 2001) and 
general (education, health and public) services (Delavallade, 2006) and; the deterioration of 
government income (Tanzi & Davoodi, 1997; Friedman et al., 2000; Ghura, 1998; Blackburn 
et al., 2008). Socio-economic consequences of corruption have also been the subject of heated 
debated with: pros
3
 and neutrals (You & Khagram, 2005) on the negative incidences on 
inequality and poverty and; the disincentive of the scourge to education in terms of years of 
schooling (Mo, 2001), registration rates (Dreher & Herzfeld, 2005; Mokaddem, 2010) and 
prospects of furthering education to postgraduate and research levels (Kodila-Tedika, 2012b). 
Other consequences of corruption investigated in the literature include, inter alia: negative 
business climate (Dzhumashev, 2009) and corporate productivity (De Rosa et al., 2010); the 
establishment of underground and shadow economies (Friedman et  al., 2000); political 
instability (Pellegrini & Gerlagh, 2004); peril to trade (Abe & Wilson,  2008); environmental 
degradation (Smith et al., 2003; Welsch, 2004; Barbier, 2010) and; the possibility of criminal 
activities (Azfar & Gurgur, 2004;  Azfar, 2005).  
Based on the above, as far as we have reviewed, the present paper has a threefold 
contribution to the existing African corruption literature. Firstly, it is the first empirical 
assessment of the role of corruption on crime in Africa. Secondly, the use of recent data 
presents findings with more updated and focused policy implications. Thirdly, it unites two 
strands of the African institutional development literature by analyzing a significant source of 
crime (corruption) and, at the same time responds to the effectiveness of policies needed to 
mitigate conflicts in Africa (control of corruption). The rest of the paper is organized as 
                                                 
3
 See, inter alia: Gupta et  al. (2002),  Gymiah-Brempong (2002),  Li et  al. (2000), Dincer & Gunalp (2008), 
Gyimah-Brempong et al. (2006)  and You & Khagram (2005).  
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follows. Section 2 discusses the data and outlines the methodology. Empirical analysis is 
covered in Section 3. We conclude with Section 4.  
 
2. Data and Methodology  
 We examine a sample of 38 African countries with data from African Development 
Indicators (ADI) of the World Bank (WB), the Institute for Economics and Peace (IEP) and 
TI. Owing to data availability constraints, the structure is cross-sectional with 2009-2010 
averages. Variables definitions and corresponding sources are detailed in Appendix 3. While 
the main dependent variable is crime, corruption (CPI) and corruption-control are the 
principal independent variables. Control variables include: the number of internal security 
officers and police per 100 000 people (police), age dependency ratio of the young as a % of 
working-age population (age), per capital economic prosperity (GDP per capita), primary 
school enrollment ratio as a % of gross enrollment (education), government effectiveness 
(government) and population density in terms of people per square km of land area 
(population). Intuitively, we expect the first five control variables to mitigate crime while the 
last should increase it. Accordingly, the police is a natural deterrent to crime, increased 
dependency (age) increases the possibility of petty crime but not of internal conflict that can 
only be effectively organized by adults, per capital economic prosperity (GDP per capita) and 
literacy (education) naturally decrease options of resorting to criminal activities for 
subsistence, government effectiveness (government) is inherently antagonistic to crime, while 
population density (population) without a corresponding increase in the number of security 
(and police) officers could seriously fuel criminal activity. Also, from intuition, cities with 
higher population densities may create greater returns to crime because criminals may have 
greater access to the wealthy and face a greater density of victims. Moreover, urban density 
makes it harder for the police to track criminals, which lead to lower probabilities of 
recognition and lower probability of arrest.  
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Details about the summary statistics and correlation analysis (showing the basic 
correlations between key variables used in this paper) are presented in Appendix 1 and 
Appendix 2 respectively.  The descriptive statistics of the variables show that, there is quite a 
degree of variation in the data utilized so that one should be confident that reasonable 
estimated nexuses would emerge. The object of the correlation matrix is to mitigate concerns 
of overparametization and multicolinearity. 
Given the cross-sectional structure of the dataset, we adopt a heteroscedasticity 
consistent Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) estimation technique. For further robustness 
purposes, we: (1) control for the unobserved heterogeneity (fixed effect) of conflict affected 
countries since they are inherently more prone to crime and violence; (2) use two different 
measurements of corruption, the CPI from TI and the corruption-control index from the ADI 
of the WB and; (3) employ the Jackknife repeated replication (JRR)
4
.  
 
3. Empirical Analysis  
 
Table 1 below presents the empirical results. Based on the findings, the following 
conclusions could be drawn. Corruption
5
 (corruption-control) is positively (negatively) 
correlated with crime, and the potential mitigation effect (by corruption-control) is higher than 
the corresponding effect of corruption (given the same specifications). This broadly implies 
that, the control of corruption potentially offsets not only crime emanating from corruption 
but also from other poor governance mechanisms like: inter alia, regulation quality, rule of 
law and voice & accountability.  
                                                 
4
JRR is a method used to estimate the sampling variability of a statistics that takes the properties of the sample 
design into account. It provides unbiased estimates of the sampling error arising from complex sample selection 
procedures; reflects the components of the sampling error introduced by the use of weighting factors that are 
dependent on the sample data obtained and; can be readily adapted to the estimation of sampling errors for 
parameters estimated using statistical modeling procedures. In fact, the general idea behind the Jackknife is to 
split a single sample into multiple subsamples and use the fluctuation among the subsamples to obtain an 
estimate of the overall sampling variability.  
5
 Note should be taken of the fact that, an increasing CPI means a decrease in the corruption level (See TI’s 
computation of the CPI).  
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Most of the significant control variables have the right signs. Growth in GDP per 
capita, literacy and age dependency are negatively correlated with crime. This is logical 
because, the first two control variables naturally decrease options of resorting to criminal 
activities for subsistence needs, while increased age dependency could only be the fruit of 
petty-juvenile crime that does not take the order of organized internal conflict. A corollary to 
this explanation is the fact that, with increased age dependence, adults may be less poised to 
engage in the risk of criminal activities for two main reasons: on the one hand, kids inherently 
make their parents to become responsible citizens principally because the latter want to 
educate by good examples and; on the other hand, the prospect of abandoning their kids for 
substantial years in jail or early death as a result of criminal activities may also strongly deter 
parents.  
 
Table 1: Effect of corruption on crime  
        
 Dependent Variable: Crime 
        
Constant 2.195*** 5.859*** 5.539*** 8.179*** 7.565*** 5.859*** 5.539*** 
 (0.220) (1.33) (1.479) (1.827) (2.046) (1.740) (1.923) 
Corruption  (CPI) --- --- --- -0.86*** -0.85*** --- --- 
    (0.270) (0.296)   
Corruption-Control -1.06*** -1.841*** -1.815*** --- --- -2.09*** -1.624** 
 (0.286 ) (0.516) (0.632)   (0.733) (0.642) 
Police --- 0.179 0.261 0.037 0.123 0.274 0.179 
  (0.142) (0.154) (0.141) (0.146) (0.174) (0.166) 
Age  --- -0.027** -0.022** -0.029*** -0.025** -0.023** -0.024* 
  (0.011) (0.011) (0.010) (0.010) (0.012) (0.013) 
GDP per capita  --- -0.503*** -0.478*** -0.402*** -0.358** -0.53 *** -0.449 * 
  (0.138) (0.155) (0.118) (0.139) (0.161) (0.244) 
Education  --- -0.014** -0.015 ** -0.014** -0.016** -0.014 -0.015* 
  (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.007) (0.008) (0.009) 
Gov. Effectiveness  --- 0.831 0.908 0.433 0.539 1.119 0.669 
  (0.567) (0.628) (0.446) (0.456) (0.754) (0.660) 
Population density  --- 0.001 0.000 -0.000 -0.001 0.001 0.000 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) 
Conflict --- --- 0.439 --- 0.627 --- 0.337 
   (0.406)  (0.418)  (0.492) 
        
Jackknife replication -- --- --- No No Yes Yes 
R² 0.33 0.59 0.59 0.55 0.57 0.56 0.60 
Fisher  13.82*** 9.87*** 8.89*** 5.28*** 7.94*** 7.78*** 6.95*** 
Observations 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 
Notes: CPI: Corruption Perception Index. All regressions are estimated using White (1980) heteroskedasticity correction. 
Standard errors in parentheses. *, **, ***: significance levels at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively.  
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4. Conclusion   
 
With earthshaking and jaw-breaking levels of corruption in the African continent, the 
question on the extent to which corruption influences crime still remains unanswered. This 
paper has assessed the effect of corruption (corruption-control) in 38 African countries using 
updated data. We have found that, crime is highly positively (negatively) correlated with 
corruption (corruption-control). The potential mitigation effect (by corruption-control) is 
higher than the corresponding positive effect of corruption, implying, corruption-control 
offsets crime emanating beyond the corruption mechanism (inter alia, other poor governance 
mechanisms). The relationship is statistically strong when controlling for the number of police 
officers, age dependency, per capital economic prosperity, level of education, government 
effectiveness and population density. Given that crime is proxied by the level of organized 
internal conflict, the findings also sustain the substantial role of corruption in the birth and 
propagation of conflicts within and across Africa.  
As a policy implication, our findings broadly indicate that, the waves of conflicts and 
crime in the African continent could be tackled to a certain extend if the fight against 
corruption is taken seriously by governments of sampled countries. The corruption-control 
efforts will go a long way not only to improving the quality of life and wellbeing of citizens 
(by protecting their lives and property from criminals), but will also create ideal conditions for 
sustainable economic growth.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
9 
 
Appendices  
 
Appendix 1: Summary Statistics and Presentation of Countries  
  
 Panel A: Summary Statistics   
Variables Mean S.D Min. Max. Observations 
  
Dependent 
Variable 
Crime  2.955 1.063 1.000 5.000 33 
       
Independent 
Variables   
Corruption (CPI) 2.789 0.940 1.100 5.700 38 
Corruption-Control  -0.678 0.571 -1.726 0.929 38 
       
 
 
Control 
Variables   
Police 2.171 1.041 1.000 5.000 38 
Age 72.219 16.427 33.981 98.925 38 
GDP per capita  2.019 0.157 1.609 2.337 38 
Education  102.91 21.796 33.000 151.69 38 
Government Effectiveness  -0.768 0.617 -2.255 0.523 38 
Population Density  67.299 88.409 2.748 424.31 38 
       
 Panel B: Presentation of Countries (38) 
 Algeria, Angola, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroun, Central African Republic, 
Chad, Congo, Côte d’Ivoire, Democratic Republic of Congo, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, 
Ethiopia, Gabon, Ghana, Kenya Liberia, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Mozambique, 
Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, Somalia, South Africa, Sudan, Swaziland, The Gambia, Tunisia, 
Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe, Tanzania, Namibia, Libya.  
       
S.D: Standard Deviation.  Min: Minimum. Max: Maximum.  
 
 
 
Appendix 2: Correlation Analysis  
Crime CPI CC Police Age GDPpc Educ GovE. Pop.  
1.000 -0.582 -0.568 -0.0776 0.144 -0.406 -0.334 -0.479 -0.080 Crime 
 1.000 0.937 0.198 -0.442 0.355 0.263 0.877 0.087 CPI 
  1.000 0.277 -0.360 0.283 0.321 0.899 0.203 CC 
   1.000 -0.243 0.351 -0.054 0.186 -0.087 Police 
    1.000 -0.595 -0.172 -0.428 0.125 Age 
     1.000 0.142 0.390 -0.241 GDPpcg 
      1.000 0.449 0.441 Educ 
       1.000 0.205 GovE. 
        1.000 Pop. 
          
CPI: Corruption Perception Index. CC: Corruption-Control. GDPpc: GDP per capita. Educ: Education. GovE: 
Government Expenditure. Pop: Population density.  
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Appendix 3: Variable Definitions 
Variables  Signs Variable Definitions (Measurements) Sources 
    
Crime  Crime  Level of Organized Conflict (Internal). Institute for Economics 
and Peace (IEP) 
    
Corruption  CPI Corruption Perception Index or perceived levels of corruption 
(the misuse of public power for private benefit) as determined 
by expert assessments and opinion surveys. 
Transparency 
International  
    
Corruption-
Control  
CC Control of corruption (estimate): captures perceptions of the 
extent to which public. 
power is exercised for private gain, including both petty and 
grand forms of corruption, as well as ‘capture’ of the state by 
elites and private interests. 
World Bank (WDI) 
    
Police  Police  Number of internal security officers and police per 100 000 
people.  
Institute for Economics 
and Peace (IEP) 
    
Age  Age Age dependency ratio, young (% of working-age population) World Bank (WDI) 
    
GDP per 
capita  
GDPpc Logarithm of GDP per capita. World Bank (WDI) 
    
Education  Educ School enrollment, primary (% of Gross). World Bank (WDI) 
    
Government 
Effectiveness 
Gov. E Government effectiveness (estimate): measures the quality of 
public services, the quality and degree of independence from 
political pressures of the civil service, the quality of policy 
formulation and implementation, and the credibility of 
governments’ commitments to such policies.  
World Bank (WDI) 
    
Population  Pop Population density (people per sq. km of land area). World Bank (WDI) 
    
WDI: World Bank Development Indicators.   
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